DSCTC Visit to Norway and Sweden spotlights shifting security dynamics in the High North and Baltic Sea 

The security dynamics along NATO’s northern flank are changing rapidly. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has ended all but the most essential political and military cooperation between Russia and the Alliance. At the same time, climate change and shrinking ice coverage have made the Arctic more accessible than ever, and great power strategic competitors are moving in to take advantage of the region’s economic potential and military significance. The post-Cold War motto for the region – High North, low tensions – is being steadily degraded by a new reality of heated geopolitics, increased regional militarisation and grey zone brinkmanship, coupled with a paralysis of the existing mechanisms for regional cooperation, such as the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council and the Council of the Baltic Sea States.  

As Norwegian and Swedish briefers made clear – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, after years of escalating aggression, drove both Finland and Sweden out of longstanding neutrality positions to join NATO. The relatively quick success of these applications has significantly changed the security landscape across the Baltic Sea region and reinforced the Alliance’s Arctic dimension. The Alliance now has a unified northeastern flank, briefers noted, but it also extended NATO’s border with Russia by 1,340 km. Allies are diligently working together across the region to adapt and augment NATO’s collective defence capabilities in line with NATO’s new regional plan for the north. 

To understand how High North Allies are adapting to the region’s changing security environment, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC) visited Norway and Sweden from 23–26 September 2024. The delegation, led by DSCTC Vice-Chair Fernando Gutierrez, included 17 members from 11 Allied countries. 

Shifting Currents in the Arctic and Baltic Sea 

Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy and the militarisation of its Arctic coastline have strained relations with NATO Allies. Whereas before 2014, the region was exceptional for the degree of dialogue and cooperation between Russia and the Allies, the prime example being the intergovernmental Arctic Council, Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine have forced NATO to refocus and revamp its deterrence and defence posture rather than strengthen mechanisms for regional collaboration. 

During the visit, Norwegian and Swedish officials expressed concern over Russian military activity in the Kola Peninsula — directly to the east of Finland — where Russia bases its Northern Fleet and guards the world’s highest concentration of nuclear weapons. Russia has been honing its ability to not only strengthen its bastion defence of the region since 2014, but to also be able to project more precise firepower at longer ranges as well. As briefers noted, “Russia does two things very well, submarines and advanced missile systems – both of which are in abundance off its bases on the Kola Peninsula.” 

Climate change has only intensified security competition in the High North. Warming ocean temperatures are inviting strategic competitors to seek ways to increase their Arctic footprints to exploit its natural resources and the potential for new shipping routes between Northern Europe and East Asia. Russia has identified the Northern Shipping Route (NSR), a sea lane stretching 5,600 km across the Arctic from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait, as an internal seaway of strategic national importance, in a move to ward off future potential access to its resource-rich northern flank. As experts reminded the delegation, 80% of Russian gas and 60% of its oil production are extracted and processed in its Arctic regions.  

Tightening sanctions regimes on Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have also driven Moscow to accelerate its attempts to develop the NSR as a new means to access Asian markets; in parallel China has plans for a new ‘Polar Silk Road’ across the Siberian coast – increased cooperation between Beijing and Moscow since 2022 is likely providing new wind behind the sails of the NSR’s development: in May, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced they would encourage private sector cooperation between their countries in the Arctic. 

The Baltic Sea Region, similarly, is more and more characterised as an area of grey zone competition that carries with it increasingly high risks – all nations bordering on the Baltic Sea are significantly dependant on their Baltic Sea trade routes as well as the increasingly dense network of undersea critical infrastructure on which their economies depend. As Swedish briefers told the delegation, a full 90% of Sweden’s trade goes by ship from its Baltic ports, and sea cables and pipelines are vital to its energy and communication systems. The sabotage of the Nord Stream II pipeline in 2022 was a stark demonstration of the region’s vulnerability to hostile hybrid and grey zone activities. Although the region is relatively stable, experts warned that Russia may be seeking ways to disrupt the status quo: in May of this year, Russia, to the alarm of Allies, published and quickly retracted plans to unilaterally expand its maritime borders with Finland and Lithuania.  

These trends have placed greater pressure on NATO and forced individual Allies to consider how prepared they are to both address threats in their neighbourhood as well as help underwrite the collective security of the broader Alliance. However, as the DSCTC delegation learned during its visit to the High North, Norway and Sweden are rising to the challenge both individually and in cooperation with their Nordic (as well as other) Allies. 

Norway’s Adaptation to the New Security Environment 

As Norwegian experts characterised it, Norway is NATO’s hinge between the North Atlantic and the eastern flank. As the first line of defence in the European High North, Norway monitors and works with Allies to deter Russian provocations. A key line of effort is the protection of the ‘Bear Gap’ between Svalbard and the Northern Norwegian mainland, which is the first of two strategic chokepoints between Russia and the open Atlantic, the other being the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. Russia’s ability to breach either gap would put the Alliance’s vital transatlantic sea lanes of communication at risk, thereby putting into doubt the US and Canada’s ability to reinforce European Allies in the event of a contingency in Europe.  

At Evenes Air Station in Northern Norway, members were briefed on how the Norwegian Royal Air Force monitors Russian activity in these waters using a variety of means, most visibly its fifth-generation F-35 fighters for surveillance and air policing and P-8 Poseidon aircraft for maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. Briefers also stressed the particular importance of the Ofotfjord area, which connects the Norwegian Sea to the railway hub of Narvik – a key staging area for Allied operations in the High North. To enhance logistics and mobility, Norway and the United States have focused on strengthening regional military infrastructure.  

In parallel, Norway is expanding its armed forces across all domains in what officials called a ‘total defence overhaul.’ Vice Admiral Rune Andersen, Commander of the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, briefed the delegation on Norway’s ambitious defence spending priorities and initiatives: earlier this year, the Norwegian Parliament approved a plan to increase the military budget by over EUR 60 billion over the next 12 years. New defence spending will equal 2.2% of Norwegian GDP in 2024, and briefers noted the amount will rise over 3% in the near term. Norway’s defence overhaul will focus on expanding maritime capabilities, boosting long-range precision firepower and improving air and missile defences.  

As briefers stressed, Norway recognises its responsibilities extend beyond the High North, however, and it is an active contributor to a range of NATO initiatives and operations. Norway is a leading supporter of Ukraine’s legitimate self-defence. Norway was the first country to come forward with a multi-year aid package with the Nansen Support Program in February 2023. Valued at EUR 6.6 billion, the program includes both humanitarian and military aid, and it is expected to allocate EUR 1.3 billion each year going forward. Norway is among those states leading in the donation of critical air defence systems to Ukraine. In early 2023, it sent two NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) and in December 2023 and February 2024 it announced that it would send additional systems and procure replacements. 

Sweden’s Contributions to NATO and Integration 

Sweden’s 7 March 2024 accession to NATO, following Finland’s in 2023, has altered the strategic balance between Russia and NATO in the Baltic Sea and the High North. Their accession presents the Alliance with new challenges, namely an additional 1,340 km border with Russia and the task of integrating the two countries into NATO structures, but these challenges are outweighed by the benefit inherent in adding two highly capable national militaries into the Alliance. And, as both Swedish and Norwegian officials stressed, the alignment of all Nordic states into NATO unites a previously artificially-divided flank across the Alliance’s northeast. 

During meetings at the Swedish Parliament in Stockholm, Defence Minister Pål Jonson briefed the delegation on how Sweden is adapting to the new demands presented by NATO membership and how its armed forces are contributing to collective defence. He said that Sweden and Finland’s full integration into NATO’s defence structures is essential to the implementation of new regional defence plans for the Alliance’s deterrence and defence in Northern Europe. To accelerate this process, Sweden is fast tracking integration into NATO structures and will soon participate in the Alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence, Forward Land Forces (FLF) brigade in Latvia led by Canada. In the near future, Sweden plans to become the framework nation for an additional FLF presence in Finland.  

To ensure its own defence and support the Alliance, Sweden has doubled its military spending since 2020 and now spends 2.2% of GDP on defence. Minister Jonson said he expects Sweden to reach 2.6% of GDP by 2028. In addition to this spending, Sweden has strengthened broader Euro-Atlantic security by providing Ukraine with military support, with donations totalling EUR 4.9 billion since 2022. The Swedish government plans to send an additional EUR 6.6 billion over the next three years.  

Allied parliamentarians saw firsthand in visits to the Muskö and Berga naval bases and the Uppsala Air Base that Sweden already has the assets in place to defend the northeastern flank. Brigadier General Patrik Gardesten, Deputy Chief of the Navy, briefed the DSCTC on how Sweden excels in the Baltic Sea’s specific operating environment, with its shallow waters and nearly 270,000 coastal islands, and how the Swedish armed forces use geography to their defensive and offensive advantage. The delegation had the opportunity to visit a Visby-class corvette in Berga and learn how the vessel, with advanced stealth capabilities, is particularly suited to the Baltic Sea and integrates into a suite of advanced maritime and coastal defence assets. 

Another key strength Sweden brings to NATO is the addition of its robust defence industrial base. To understand the size and scope of Sweden’s air and space defence industrial capabilities, Allied parliamentarians visited Saab’s Head Office in Stockholm, where they learned how the company is supporting Sweden’s defence through its core business areas, which include advanced weapons, sensors, fighter jets, submarines, advanced air defence systems as well as command and control systems. At the Uppsala Air Base, the delegation saw a flight demonstration of Saab’s Grippen fighter, which Colonel Carl Bergqvist of the Swedish Air Force said complement F-35 fighters because of the Grippen’s lower operating costs and limited maintenance needs. 

The Need for Adaptation and Challenges Ahead 

The tasks ahead for Norway and Sweden are similar despite one being an original member of the Alliance and the other the newest. Each country must adapt to the deteriorating security landscape in the Euro-Atlantic area by improving their individual capabilities and their ability to support Allied operations.  

High-level officials in both Norway and Sweden emphasised the numerous challenges that have come along with NATO's rapid refocus on territorial defence after 2022, particularly in the High North and across the Baltic Sea region. These challenges include securing adequate supply lines, acquiring sufficient military equipment and, most critically, recruiting and training personnel. The DSCTC learned about the success of each country’s conscription model, which has made military service both competitive and prestigious for young men and women. To meet the growing personnel demands of their armed forces, Norway plans to increase its number of conscripts from 9,000 to 13,500 annually by 2036, while Sweden aims to grow its conscript numbers from 8,000 to 10,000 per year by 2030. Both nations noted they had no trouble meeting their recruitment goals and felt confident about their ability to expand when needed.  

In addition to those mentioned above, the DSCTC visited and/or met with members of the following:  

• The Norwegian Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) in Bodø, Norway 
• Ramsund Naval Base in Ramsund, Norway 
• The Osmarka US Predisposition Site in Evenes, Norway 
• The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Defence of the Riksdag in Stockholm, Sweden 

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Photos courtesy of the Riksdag of Sweden, the Berga Naval Base, and the Evenes Air Station, Norway.