Israel’s relations with Ukraine are not as close as many would like them to be. The case for supporting Ukraine unequivocally in its war with Russia seems overwhelming. The sovereign democratic state was invaded three years ago by its much more powerful neighbor, seeking to destroy its independence and absorb it. Yet Israel has offered it only half-hearted support throughout its desperate struggle to repel the invading forces. Why is that?
There were very good reasons. At stake for Israel was a vital aspect of its own national security. The issue involved Iran, Syria, and Russia.
Iran had long regarded Syria as a key component of its “Shi’ite Crescent,” using the country as a base for its anti-Israel military operations and as a convenient route to Lebanon, along which it transported a vast range of military equipment to keep Hezbollah well armed. When in 2011 opposition to the regime of its autocratic president Bashar al-Assad developed into civil war, Iran supported Assad by way of its formidable IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), and also induced Hezbollah to back him with boots on the ground.
Even so, by 2015 Assad, who had been fighting a variety of opposition forces for four years, was in real danger of being defeated by a combination of Western-backed rebels, jihadist groups like ISIS, and Kurdish militias. Russia had long-standing military and economic ties with Syria, in particular the Tartus naval facility, its only Mediterranean base. The Assad regime was a key Russian ally in the Middle East which Vladimir Putin did not want to lose. Moreover, he viewed US and European support for anti-Assad forces as an attempt to weaken Russian influence in the region.
So the Russian president mounted a multi-faceted intervention in support of Assad, which included airstrikes, ground support, military advisers, and naval operations. It did not take long for this formidable Russian military force to alter the balance of power in Syria’s civil conflict in favor of the Assad regime.
Meanwhile, Iran had maintained its anti-Israel military operations in Syria. In response, Israel had conducted hundreds of airstrikes targeting Iranian bases, weapons convoys, and missile storage facilities, as well as Syrian air defenses and key IRGC commanders. Russia’s active involvement in the Syrian conflict created a new strategic problem.
Russia, equipped with sophisticated hi-tech weaponry, operated advanced air defense systems in Syria. If Israel was to continue striking Iranian and Hezbollah targets – which, for the protection of the nation, it had to do – the possibility of triggering direct conflict with Russian forces was a real danger. Israel needed Moscow’s tacit approval, or at least compliance.
Nothing formal was ever committed to paper, but a strategic understanding was reached between the two nations which allowed Israel to conduct military operations against Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria without Russia interfering. It was known in government circles as “deconfliction.”
To avoid unintended clashes, Israel and Russia established a direct military hotline which allowed Israeli and Russian forces to coordinate air operations over Syria. Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, visited Moscow on many occasions to maintain this coordination.
For example, in May 2018 Israel launched one of its largest airstrikes in Syria, targeting Iranian military infrastructure. Despite Russia’s presence and its advanced S-400 air defense systems, Russian forces did not engage Israeli jets. Even after the start of the Ukraine war, Israel continued to operate in Syrian airspace without Russian intervention.
Inevitably, Israel’s stance on the Ukraine-Russia war has been an attempt to maintain diplomatic relations with both nations. In March 2022, Israel did vote at the UN in favor of condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but subsequently it refrained from taking action that might have affected its deconfliction understanding with Moscow. Israel could not risk being blocked from striking at Iran’s military build-up in Syria and its arming of Hezbollah.
Israel did, however, provide significant humanitarian aid to Ukraine, which included food, medical supplies, and a field hospital to treat civilian casualties. The Ukrainians, though, were desperate for direct military support from wherever it could be provided. Their requests to Israel for advanced defense systems, such as the Iron Dome, were not granted. Regarding Israel as unsympathetic, Ukraine has consistently supported UN resolutions critical of Israel’s policies in the Palestinian territories. In reaction Israel has, at times, abstained from votes on resolutions condemning Russian actions in Ukraine.
Some softening of relations became evident in the fall of 2024. Every year, more than 30,000 Israeli ultra-Orthodox Jews go on pilgrimage to Uman in Ukraine to celebrate Rosh Hashanah at the burial site of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov. This tradition has continued despite security concerns in both regions.
In 2024, the arrangement got entangled with more mundane matters.
The Patriot, a mobile interceptor surface-to-air missile system, was first given to Israel by the US during the first Gulf War more than 30 years ago. It targets and destroys enemy rocket fire before it hits its intended target. Replaced by Israel’s own missile defense systems, including the Iron Dome, the Patriot system was decommissioned in 2024.
Kyiv approached both the US and Israel asking for the mothballed Patriot system. Israel hesitated, fearing possible Russian retaliation. One US media outlet suggested that Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky then tied permission for that year’s religious pilgrimage to Uman to receiving the Patriot.
In any event, the US agreed to transfer the Patriot system to Ukraine, while the media report alleges that Israel informed Putin ahead of the transfer that it was only “returning the Patriot system to the US,” and that it was America’s decision as to what became of it.
How the fall of Assad in Syria, ascension of Trump in the US impacted Israel-Ukraine ties
The fall of Assad in Syria on December 8, 2024, and the collapse of his regime has resulted in a major change in the dynamic. Russia has effectively disengaged from military activity within Syria, and the informal deconfliction mechanism between Israel and Russia has ceased to operate. An even more significant change, however, has been the start of Donald Trump’s second term as US president on January 20, 2025.
Only a few days after assuming office, he declared that he intended to negotiate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war within his first 100 days in the post. This plan involved immediate discussions with Putin.
On February 24, Trump announced that Putin had agreed to the deployment of European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine as part of a potential peace deal. That same day, which marked the third anniversary of the conflict, the UN General Assembly voted on a resolution, co-sponsored by Ukraine and the EU, condemning Russia’s invasion and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory.
The resolution was adopted, with 93 countries voting in favor. Voting against were 18. They included Russia, the US, and – explicable but hard to justify – Israel.
Trump is in active negotiations with Putin and already on record as half-legitimizing the invasion. He probably felt he could not vote in favor of Russia’s immediate withdrawal from Crimea while he was working toward a truce probably involving a freeze of the present position.
Netanyahu, bearing in mind Trump’s unequivocal support for Israel on the one hand, and remembering the anti-Israel stance taken by Ukraine in past UN votes on the other, could justifiably have joined the 65 nations that abstained. For Israel virtually to validate Russia’s invasion will do nothing at all for future Israel-Ukraine relations.■
The writer’s latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.