How Washington Should Manage Rising Middle Powers

Across the globe, a diverse group of nations that view world politics differently from the United States are rising and flexing their diplomatic muscle in ways that are complicating American statecraft. From Africa to Latin America, to the Middle East and Asia, these emerging powers refuse to fit into traditional U.S. thinking about the world order. The successful pursuit of American interests in the mid-21st century calls for a strategy that attracts them toward the United States and its ideals but without expecting them to line up in lockstep with Washington.

“We refuse to be a pawn in a new cold war,” Indonesian President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, said in November 2022. His views are shared in some form or another by leaders of Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. All 10 of these nations are either in the G-20 or have economies large enough to warrant membership. A majority of them have populations larger than Germany’s. Collectively, they make up around a third of the world’s population and a fifth of its economic production, while also constituting a major share of the so-called global south’s population and economic production.

In the next two decades, emerging powers like these will climb the ranks of the world’s largest economies and populations, reshaping the structure of world politics in the process. Their diplomacy is increasingly ambitious. And they are taking positions that run counter to those of the United States with growing boldness. Washington and its allies should accept not only that these powers are emerging, but also that as they grow stronger, they will not align with Washington’s preferences on many international issues, especially when it comes to Russia and China.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, most of these powers declined to join the U.S.-led coalition to support Ukraine, refusing to take concrete action with sanctions on Russia or weapons for Kyiv. Some emerging powers, such as India and Turkey, even expanded economic ties with Russia.

Meanwhile, several of them pursued active diplomacy to end the war, challenging the U.S. policy of supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes.” Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, for example, pitched a plan to assemble a peace club to end the war and urged Washington to “stop encouraging war and start talking about peace.” Separately, Jokowi visited Kyiv and then Moscow, urging Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin to start a dialogue. South Africa led a delegation of African leaders to end the war, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has maintained a working relationship with Putin and sought to keep diplomatic channels open.

Most of these emerging powers also have warm ties with Beijing. They are reluctant to do anything that would endanger their economic relations with China. On a visit to Beijing in 2023, for example, Lula pledged to work with China to “balance world geopolitics”—a phrase that implied upending American global primacy. Even India, which sees China as an adversary and has grown much closer to the United States in recent years, is very unlikely to back the United States militarily in the event of a war over Taiwan.

Washington thus needs to avoid the urge to frame this world historical moment as a neo-Cold War ideological struggle. When the United States appeals to the emerging powers to sacrifice their interests for the liberal world order, they suspect that it is simply trying to woo them for its hard-power struggles with Russia and China. Their officials are quick to cite the 2003 Iraq War as evidence that Washington is not so committed as it claims to the liberal international order. They point to the many cases where the United States has compromised on its high principles and backed autocrats. President Joe Biden’s support for Israel’s campaign in Gaza has only given them another reason to doubt the veracity of American claims to exceptional moral authority.

Most of these emerging powers have limited political headroom anyway for ideological struggles of the kind that so often animate U.S. foreign policy. Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar drove this point home when he pointed out that Europe’s ability to wean itself from Russian energy was a luxury that India did not have. “I have a population at $2,000 [per capita annual income],” he said. “I also need energy, and I am not in a position to pay high prices for oil.”

Given frictions between Washington and so many emerging powers of late, it can be tempting to disregard them and focus solely on countering Beijing and Moscow. But this would be a mistake. The emerging powers don’t pose a threat of the kind that U.S. adversaries can, but they also can’t just be ignored. China and Russia are certainly not going to ignore them—in fact, they are actively courting their leaders for political ties and market access with the hope of building a network of political and economic partners to obviate the need for ties to the West.

The emerging powers are also very open to China’s backing for alternative international institutions, such as the BRICS New Development Bank, that offer the prospect of infusions of capital without the bothersome conditions that accompany Western loans. They are critical of many aspects of the U.S.-led international order, which they see as dominated by former colonial powers and unfairly structured to serve the interests of the world’s wealthiest nations.

The good news for Washington is that the emerging powers don’t want to be vassals of China any more than they want to be vassals of America. They are not swing states ready to pick sides in a neo-Cold War. In fact, they actively seek a more fluid and multipolar world, one in which they believe they will have more leverage and freedom of maneuver. Many, moreover, maintain closer economic ties with the United States than China, especially when it comes to investment and defense cooperation.

Washington can make progress with these powers if it puts aside grand ideological framings about the liberal world order and focuses on developing a positive value proposition that offers meaningful benefit to their economic and political development, sovereignty, and aspirations for an enhanced voice in international affairs.

Although trade agreements have become politically unpopular for Republicans and Democrats alike, market access remains a powerful tool the United States has to this end. Other mutually beneficial economic arrangements are imaginable, focused on specific sectors and packages. So is cooperation on infrastructure investments, technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, deforestation, public health, and other areas.

Even when making progress on common interests, the emerging powers will also maintain substantial relationships with U.S. adversaries. Washington should not fall into the trap of judging the quality of its relations with the emerging powers by the strength of their ties to China or Russia.

Ultimately, the best way to engage with these nations is to help them strengthen their sovereignty so that they can resist the influence of U.S. adversaries and gain a real stake in sustaining a peaceful world order. This will take time and a change of approach but is likely to pay long-term benefits to America’s prosperity and continued global leadership.

This essay draws on research from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report “Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft.”